Addendum #1

ENDORSEMENTS FOR RICHARD M. PATTON

A CITATION FOR CREATING THE FIRST EVER FIRE SPRINKLER SYSTEM TO PROTECT HUMAN LIFE RATHER THAN PROPERTY

“Richard M. Patton is cited by
the publisher and editors of Engineering News Record from among the many
men who have served the best interest of the construction industry”.
Patton was nominated for the
prestigious “Engineer of the Year
Award” by the publishers of the McGraw
Hill Magazine, “Engineering News
Record’, 1972

FATHER OF HOME SPRINKLERS

“I would like to say that we invented the concept (a residential fire sprinkler system) but we didn’t. Instead we borrowed it from a gentleman by the name of Richard Patton. Dick is sometimes referred to as the father of the residential concept.”

From Page 64 of “Alpha to Omega- The Evolution In Residential Fire Protection”
by Ronny J. Colman, Fire Chief, City of San Clemente and Former President, The International Association of Fire Chiefs - Published 1985
Dear Mr. Patton:

Few people in this world make a major contribution to the welfare of their fellow men in their lifetime. It has been a privilege for me to have met and talked to you. In my opinion you are one of the few exceptional men that I have known. You are making a major contribution to the total community in your lifetime.
Joe Randall, Deputy Director of Planning and Inspection City of Fresno, California - December 21,
1973

Dear Mr. Patton:

It has been my pleasure this past week to read the Patton report No. 10 dated April 1970 and No 11. dated June 1970.
Please accept my most sincere compliments and congratulations for producing and publishing this report.
In my 32 years in the professional fire service, this is the most cogent and comprehensive analysis and presentation of facts in relation to life protection from fire that I have ever read.
In the publication of this report you have rendered an inestimable service to the professional fire forces of the nation as well as the countless numbers of helpless people confined in institutions.
My sincere gratitude to you and my best wishes for continued success in this field of endeavor which is a real and lasting service to humanity.

James M. Brett, Fire Chief of Kingston
New York Fire Department - October 2,
1970

Dear Mr. Patton:

As Fire Chief of the city of Anaheim, I receive literature from all walks of life. . . Occasionally, however, I receive a gem that gives me a wisp of anticipation for future “in basket” adventures. Your letter entitled “America’s Fire Dangerous Buildings and the Non Sprinklered High Rise” is such a gem.
After completing the first reading, I immediately was induced into a second one.
Your words of advice and encouragement have reminded me of my responsibility to continue my quest for fire safety and public education.
Thank you again, best of luck to you in your continuing efforts to make America a safer place from the disastrous affects of fire.

Chet Bowman, Fire Chief, City of Anaheim, CA - September 1, 1987

Dear Dick:

As you can imagine we have a large number of instructors come and go through out various classes. Most are quality people in their field with a nice presentation. Seldom, if ever, are they able to spark my imagination or challenge me to re-evaluate my thoughts and beliefs about fire. This you have done.
I will not think of the phenomenon of flashover without thinking of our discussions and the simply option I have overlooked for so long. Sometimes the most simple concept or idea becomes lost in the search for an involved technical answer.

Roger B. Hansen, Fire Service
Institute, Iowa State University -
October 7, 1987

Dear Mr. Patton:

We are pleased to report that we have received on April 29, 1974, firm bids for the installation of a Patton Life Safety Fire Suppression System throughout the 19 story Adams Hotel now under construction in Phoenix, Arizona.
The low bid was checked out and proved valid and has been accepted. Last fall we had previously requested bids for a complete sprinkler installation based on architectural drawings and specifications. At that time we received bids from a number of sprinkler contractors who based their prices on conventional NFPA 13 sprinkler system designs.
In this instance, the estimates indicate that Patton Life Safety System would cost approximately 40% less than the conventional system resulting in savings for this project in excess of $140,000.

Charles D. Raines, Project Manager Mardian Construction Company, Phoenix, Arizona - May 1, 1974

Dear Dick:

“I have been learning from you for many, many years through your writings and I consider your influence on my philosophy on fire protection to be very significant.
I encourage you to continue with your work. Your efforts have already yielded significant success in the world of fire protection.”

George Oster, Chief Instructor
Fire Services Institute, Iowa State
University - October 27, 1987

AFFORDABLE HOME SPRINKLERS

“In 1964 Dick Patton tried to get them to adopt a residential (sprinkler) standard which they refused to do. In 1962 and 63 we did full scaled testing that proved the viability of residential sprinklers using only 10 gpm. Faced with
competition NFPA finally in 1975, 10 years after it was first offered to them, developed NFPA 13D.”

Extract From Letter to Dan Mallow,
P.E., From J. L. Randall, P.E. FPE
Published in “Sprinkler Age” - April
1987

(Comment by Patton: The NFPA never allowed a fire protection system to be designed for the 10 or 15 gpm which is normally available for a home; rather the NFPA-13 code set the minimum water demand at approximately twice as much water as a home will have.)

TALKING TO THE CANADIAN FIRE CHIEFS

‘Dick Patton is a man who can’t be too popular with a lot of people across North America.
Speaking to the 69th Annual Canadian Fire Chiefs Conference recently, Dick Patton took on some of the most powerful companies in the World, the Insurance Firms of North America... and he came awfully close to accusing them of being parties to murder, for the sake of money.
What Dick Patton had to say, I suggest, should be the starting point for a full fledged investigation by someone, probably at a senior government level with qualified professionals involved.
And should such an investigation prove Mr. Patton to be as little as 10% right, then there should be some changes made... right now and right here.
The 19th century fire insurance industry had one great ally and one great enemy, says Patton.
The ally was fire. It put bread on the Underwriters table. The enemy was the CATASTROPHIC fire that bankrupted him.
Accordingly, according to the Patton theory, the fire insurance companies went to work to defeat the enemy and, as he says, they developed a technology of fire that guaranteed that two things would happen: No. 1-the big fire would be controlled. No. 2-the little fire would remain a reason for buying insurance.”

From Keystone Notebook a Byline by
Garth Stouffer, The Brandon Sun
Newspaper, Brandon, Manitoba -
Wednesday, September 14, 1977

PART II

DEVELOPING AND PROMOTING A NEW FIRE SCIENCE

A. SYNOPSIS

No individual in the field of fire safety conducted more creative research, brought about greater change, developed better life safety solutions, rose more rapidly in the profession, discovered more enemies, and incurred greater wrath than Richard
M. Patton.

As a young fire protection engineer, I had an analytical and inquisitive mind, and the vision to penetrate that great forest of “a hundred thousand codes and regulations” to identify and perfect simple and affordable solutions to the fire problem.

I comprehended that fire losses and fire deaths could be reduced by an excess of 90%, even as the total cost of the fire prevention and control activities could be pared.

I researched fire, and fire control systems, and created new fire protection systems that had the potential to reduce building construction costs, reduce the cost of the fire services, dramatically reduce the cost of fire insurance, and reduce fire deaths by an excess of 90%.

I developed the technology to make automatic fire control systems extremely practical for high rise buildings, hotels, theaters, places of assembly, hospitals and even one family dwellings. At the time I first began developing such systems, not only were fire sprinkler systems not being installed in such buildings, the fire regulations virtually prohibited such protection. Indeed, the majority of the “fire experts” ridiculed the concept of sprinklering all buildings, including dwellings.

There has not been one significant technical advancement in fire sprinkler system design since the 1950s that I did not first define, advocate, calculate or originate. I can do more than state this. I can produce all the ideas and advancements in written form, predating their eventual acceptance within the sprinkler and regulatory organizations. Many of the technical advancements I originated and proved valid years ago, are still waiting entry into a code system that has a very small doorway for meaningful change.

The measure of my contribution to society is more than an assortment of writings, research findings and technical works.

My research and writings accomplished two things of major significance between the l950s and the l990s. First, of major significance, I took the cover off a self serving and false “fire science” that evolved from the insurance industry teachings at the turn of the century. This antiquated, so called “fire science” was not real science; rather it was a family of legislated regulations and controls, that rewarded and enriched all those who became partners in the code making establishment. This commercially oriented “fire science” inflicted on the public an enormous cost in human suffering

Secondly, in the place of this false and self serving “fire science,” I have defined, proven, and set into motion the foundation of a new fire science, which will eventually make fire deaths a rarity in the United States.

My life has been dedicated to changing the code system to be less oriented toward exploiting fire, and more oriented toward eliminating fire.

The building blocks of this new fire science are described below.

B. BREAKTHROUGHS IN SPRINKLER TECHNOLOGY

For more than 50 years, beginning in 1890s and continuing into the l950s, a very rigidly enforced “standard” for the design of a fire sprinkler system in the U.S. maintained technological advances at virtually zero. The “standard” system consisted of very long dead ended steel pipes, with pipe sizing from one inch to sometimes 10 inch size. The system was devoid of hydraulic science, extremely unbalanced hydraulically with the very same sprinkler head orifice size employed for both light hazard and very high hazard properties.

This antiquated system required an enormous water supply as a “minimum”, but usually the non scientific sizing (of the piping system) produced a layout capable of delivering no more than 10% to 20% of the code required supply directly to the early fire. Thus, because 80 to 90 percent of the water (demanded as “minimum” criteria) for approvals, could NOT be delivered to the early fire, frequently fires overpowered the hydraulically weak systems.

I produced the first sprinkler designs, based on real engineering principles.

Below I list but a few of the milestones of my protracted battle with the regulatory system, to allow the use the new technology for the purpose of reducing loss of life in America.

1. 1965:
FOREIGN APPROVAL: The first major recognition for the better sprinkler design methods occurred when the chief engineer of Lloyds of London approved my engineering designs for the reinsurance market.
Partly through my efforts, research toward better system designs initiated in the United Kingdom, Europe and Australia.

2. 1973:
PATTON’S HIGH HAZARD FIRE SOLUTION:
In April of 1963, one of the two major U.S. “highly protected risk” insurers, the Factory Insurance Association (now the Improved Risk Insurers) produced a research report (“Fire Tests In High Piled Combustible Stock”), which contained fire sprinkler system design criteria for high hazard warehousing.
Applying this new insurance industry sprinkler design criteria to the distilling industry, whisky in bottles in cardboard cartons stored 21 foot high, would require a 4,450 gallon per minute water supply. This represented enormously costly design. The end result was that most warehousing properties (except the huge facilities) would remain unprotected, high rated, because protection was too costly.

During Nov. of 1968, I countered this incredibly wrong insurance industry promoted engineering with a “Patton” system design. A Distilling Industry financed test No 3 (See FMRC research report Ser. No-l7792), was held at the Factory Mutual Research Center in Norwood, Mass. A test was conducted involving 21 foot high cardboard cartons of whiskey (alcohol) in bottles.

Rather than designing to the insurer’s prescribed water density, I designed for much higher initial density, directly over the early fire site.

The results, only three sprinklers originally fused, directly over the fire. The high initial density dramatically knocked down and controlled the early fire, allowing a full 13 minutes for “easy” overhaul of the very subdued fire with small hose. At 15 minutes into the test, one more head fused (total water needed was 190 gpm).

Rather than controlling the well contained and small fire, with hose, as would have been normal procedure, F.M. turned off the water and then claimed “uncertain results.”

INCREDIBLY, WHERE 4,450 GPM HAD BEEN DEEMED NEEDED, THE FIRE WAS CONTROLLED WITH A MERE 190 GPM AT THE FIRE SITE. This test, plus other studies I had conducted, revealed that, for decades, the insurers had been demanding designs, to protect industrial risks that not only made the systems incredibly costly, with huge water requirements, but these costly designs also produced dangerously weak systems. An estimated 85% of all insurance premiums accrued from “unprotected” risks.

Although within the distilling industry we won substantial freedom from the insurers improper and costly engineering, most industries are subject to the improper design regulations, even today.

3. 1973:
TRANSAMERICA BUILDING, SAN FRANCISCO:
Sprinklers had not been planned for this high rise building (of dramatic architecture) to begin with. Fire Chief Emmett Condon requested that I meet with the mechanical engineers, provide the basic design parameters for the far more economical Life Safety System, and help him “sell” such protection to the design team and owners. I did, and the TransAmerica building became one of the first sprinklered high rise buildings in the U.S.

4. 1974:
ADAMS RODEWAY HOTEL, PHOENIX, AZ:
A conventional (NFPA-l3) fire sprinkler system had been bid for this 19 story hotel, and the low bid was $340,000. Mr. Chuck Raines of Mardian Construction Company then requested a Patton Life Safety Sprinkler design, which I provided. It was installed for $197,000.

5. 1976:
UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS MEDICAL CENTER, KANSAS
CITY: This enormous medical facility had the steel already erected when it became apparent that a cost overrun of $10,000,000 was occurring.

I was called in as a consultant, and discovered that only the basement (140,000 sq ft) of this seven floor, but 12 level building (counting interstitial areas) was to be sprinklered. I canceled the basement only sprinkler system plus standpipes (NFPA-13 code desigri),recovering $403,000. Then I designed a Patton Life Safety multi grid sprinkler system for all twelve levels of the building (approximately 1,370,000 sq ft) which bid at only $431,000, including standpipes and pumps.

Then, having a “completely sprinklered” facility, superfluous fire protection (including excess fireproof ing) was eliminated, with construction cost savings exceeding $5 million dollars accruing.

6. RESIDENTIAL SPRINKLER SYSTEM BREAKTHROUGHS:

During the late l970s and l980s, I strongly promoted the concept of sprinklering all apartments, condos and dwellings. Finally, many fire chiefs in California began to request my cooperation in getting builders to provide such protection. Fire officials would inform builders that they would “approve” my non-NFPA-standard, far more economical designs. Then the officials would also allow other “trade of f” incentives to builders. The largest apartment project in Northern California (over 1000 units) was protected with the Patton system, and many “saves” have since occurred in this complex.

After the Patton designed sprinklers for housing was gaining very wide acceptance in California, only then did the NFPA issue an NFPA-13R code, finally opening the door to protecting human life in multi family dwellings with such protection. Very serious NFPA code barriers still exist, especially relative to protecting single family homes.

7. ONE THAT GOT AWAY:

Dan Quinan, State Fire Marshal of Nevada, was shocked to find that the enormous MGM Grand Hotel, under construction near Las Vegas, not only was being built near 100% non sprinklered, but also had an incredible “flash fire” potential.

When Quinan attempted to force design flaws to be corrected, and also gain an agreement for an economical Life Safety Sprinkler System to be installed, the builders/owners refused. Local and state authorities then established policy so as to prevent the fire marshal from having jurisdiction in that county.

Dan Quinan was then legislated out of office.

In 1980 a fire flashed across the casino, traveling at an estimated speed of 19 feet a second. The fire killed 85, and endangered over 5000 who became trapped above as the fire raged on the lower levels.

C. A MEASURE OF THE VALUE OF THE NEW SPRINKLER TECHNOLOGY

My research findings and new design methods were never patented, but rather offered freely to the public, because human life was at stake, and I wanted no barrier to prevent the application. However, a measure of the worth of my work was revealed through studies and proposed exploitations by the Factory Mutual Research organization.

During 1966 I met with James Smith, V.P. of F.M. and Dr. William Livingston, researcher, as plans were being made by F.M. to develop ways to improve sprinklers.

I freely discussed all my new system design concepts, which had already achieved 50% to 75% reduction in cost for protecting high hazard properties of the distilling industry.

The design concepts that I freely gave were then built into an F.M. “special hazard” system to be tested against high hazard risks. But, instead of discharging plain water (which was cheap and affective), the researchers added a small pump and tank (filled with a gelling agent). Although this added hardware actually increased costs, the new ways of design still produced a
very dramatic cost reduction for the entire system, as well as a
greatly improved fire control capability.

The F.M. adaptations of my system became patentable. The added “water gelling” feature was the key to gaining a system with many patented components.

After patenting the components of the system, Factory Mutual packaged the design, along with data showing extremely good test results, into an “offering.” F.M. approached many U.S. businesses to induce them to purchase the rights to this new system, so as to be able to market the system with F.M. approvals. F.M. sales projections for the system showed a market that would grow to exceed one billion dollars per year.

Interestingly, while the insurers claimed that the F.M. system (essentially my system with a “jelled water” feature) would be worth $1 billion per year, insurance reps also appeared at the BOCA, International hearings (where I was urging that these same advances be built into low cost—light hazard systems to protect human life). These insurance industry “experts” testified that the Patton “life safety” system was not needed and had little value.

F.M. never did sell their gelled water system to a U.S. business, perhaps because essentially the very same economies and protection could be achieved with a non patented plain water system.

D. CONCEPTUAL FIRE PROTECTION - THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF A NEW FIRE SCIENCE

Within the field of fire protection, in order to construct a better fire science than that which was bequeathed to us by the early fire insurers, it was necessary to examine and deal with the basic ideas of how to protect life and property from fire.

The foundation upon which old fire science (as we knew it in the 1950s) was constructed was oriented to make money from fire.

Fire was a “national problem” that generated both jobs and wealth for all those who were part of the code making and regulatory system.

I looked upon fire as a technological problem for which “easy” and “inexpensive” solutions were available. But the real solutions were seldom being recognized or used.

So, along with my own technologic breakthroughs, I wrote and spoke of new ways of solving the fire problem. My writings and technical advances, in sum total, represent a foundation for a NEW FIRE SCIENCE as illustrated below.

1. A STARTLING CONCLUSION: THE REVERED FIREPROOF BUILDING IS NOT A FIRE SAFE BUILDING

The fire insurers, believing the size of the loss could best be controlled through compartmentation, and a grand array of building construction and zoning regulations, created a fire code environment where the building official became the “fire expert.” Small contained fires were “acceptable,” and human life was routinely lost as those “within the compartment on fire” burned. The cult of the “FIREPROOF BUILDING,” was born, and then flourished for decades; and tens of thousands of people burned within those fireproofed walls.

Early in mY career I came to a straight forward conclusion as to why so many burned within buildings deemed to be “fireproof.” It was a conclusion not to the liking of many.

2. IT’S THE CONTENTS THAT COUNT

It’s the contents that count, not the building itself, said I.
The fireproof building is nothing more than an excellent furnace, within which the contents burn, much like wood burns within the stove, and humans are roasted daily within those furnaces called “fireproof” structures.

Even the one family dwelling was considered “adequately” protected because the interior was wrapped in wallboard, a “fireproof ing” material designed to trap and contain the heat and gases within the structure.

They had regulated the building for decades, but it was the contents fire that killed.

This was my first, and perhaps most important arrow, shot through the heart of a private fire code making operation; that was oriented toward controlling the markets, not reducing loss of life.

3. THERE’S ONLY ONE TRUE SOLUTION TO FIRE

Fire prevention often fails, and when fire does occur, there is no solution that works satisfactorily, except one. PUT IT OUT.

The basic combustibility of the contents of most buildings cannot be eliminated through regulations. Our human environment is fundamentally combustible, and growing ever more flammable..

When contents burn, those exposed to the combustion gases, which are trapped within the fireproofed building.., are killed. So, the solution is a simple one... detect fire early.., and kill the fire before the fire kills the people.

Sounds obvious? Sometimes it’s the obvious that’s never seen. Five decades and more of fire scientists came and went, yet failed to see it. And, when I saw it, and said it, most opposed it.

4. AUTOMATIC FIRE CONTROL (THE PROTRACTED BATTLE)

Put the fire out automatically. Kill it automatically, before it kills. The technology to do it is easy, if current “knowledge” doesn’t blind you, I said, in the mid 1950s.

But, between the saying and the doing, an enormous gulf required crossing.

According to the “experts” of the time, heat operated detectors could not do it. That was not only “known,” but written in stone. They’ll all die before the link will fuse, was the accepted knowledge of the day.

These were extremely powerful barriers to be overcome. First I researched the technology, and created practical water base, fire control systems for every building type. Then I articulated the case for fire control for protecting human life.

5. THE FLASHOVER EQUATION

A few government scientists, within the laboratory, had discovered the phenomenon of room flashover, perhaps even before I was born. But, none recognized its significance. Flashover is the transition point, I said, where a small fire suddenly becomes a killer, a killer that can move so fast as to overtake and drop its victims, even as the door is near. Flashover is the killer, the prime reason why they die.

This killer thumbs its nose at the building code, and sends its deadly gases through fire rated barriers, and from floor to floor, as readily as water penetrates a sieve.

6. FIRE IS FASTER THAN THE FIRE ENGINES

It was not a happy thought, and often not appreciated, but the truth was there. From the moment fire starts, until all within the home are dead, will often be but 200 ticks of that clock. Flashover can happen within three minutes, sometimes two, and short seconds later the killing will begin.

From the time the call is placed, which may well be delayed, until hose in hand and mask on face the fireman enters, will usually be at least five minutes, often well in excess of ten.

Fireman save buildings, but far too seldom lives.

7. LITTLE FIRES, PROMPTLY DETECTED, ARE SO EASILY QUENCHED

When a home’s fully ablaze, great skill and powerful tools are essential.

When a fire is very small, a glass of water will do the j ob.

The magic tool of the fireman, is the water spray. It’s truly astounding the way that fire dies when enveloped by a wall of tiny water drops.

Every home has far more water than that little fire can survive, if properly applied, and promptly. But the fire codes were oriented so as to virtually guarantee that water, in its most effective form, spray, would NOT be applied to the fire prior to the arrival of the firemen.

So, why not install throughout the home detectors, fire detectors that will really work? And, when that tiny fire is known to be alive, why not quench it quick and sure with water spray?

Install reliable detectors throughout a home. Then install a garden hose in every home, at the ready when fire strikes. What’s wrong with those ideas?

WHO SAYS THAT IT’S NOT FAIR TO PUT THAT FIRE OUT BEFORE THE FIREMEN ARRIVE?

8. TWO SIDES OF THE FIRE CODES

The fire code and regulatory system defines a marketplace, where those who sell products, systems and services do business.

When a code defines a product, and mandates its use, the inspector who enforces the code also “sells” the product.

Codes can be written so as to aid the businessman who trades in the fire marketplace. Or, codes can be written to protect human life. One does not always follow the other.

Perhaps, no concept I’ve articulated, in writings and in talks, is more essential to the founding of a new science of fire safety than this one. This truth, above all others, provides the explanation as to why that huge abundance of fire and building codes in the United States, has failed to reduce the fire deaths.

9. THE PROMOTING OF THE CONCEPT OF FULLY HONEST FIRE INVESTIGATIONS

All “official” fire investigations are oriented so as to protect the fire code and regulatory system from legal actions, to the greatest extent practical. Often, this requires a somewhat simplistic assigning of the blame to “others,” with serious code and regulatory flaws being concealed.

Many times I have analyzed major and/or deadly fires so as to determine the true (hidden) causes.

For example, when the Harmer House Nursing Home, which had been constructed “near perfect” relative to the NFPA Life Safety Code-No. 101, burned on Jan 9, 1970, killing 31, both the state fire marshal and the NFPA fire investigation reports put the blame on the carpeting, NOT a thing covered by the NFPA code. The intent, of course, was to imply that the NFPA-lOl code was not generally flawed; rather all that was needed was to simply apply new regulatory controls on carpet installed in nursing homes.

Not true, I wrote. Indeed, in order to get the carpeting to burn to any significant degree, the lab technicians had to turn it upside down and install it on the ceiling of the gas fired “Steiner Tunnel Test” apparatus.

The Harmer House fire was a typical room flashover fire, I wrote; the carpet was simply one of the many combustible items (furnishings) that fed that flashover fire. Flashover, I pointed out, represented a death threat in ALL NURSING HOMES, indeed all human occupancies which contained no built in system to guarantee early fire detection and control.

The concealment of the true cause of the fire deaths by the Harmer House investigators, of course led to future flashover fed fires, such as those that occurred at the Beverly Hills Supper Club, the MGM Hotel and the DuPonte Plaza Hotel.

These nine ideas above are but a sampling of the basic truths Itve written of. Basic truths, especially when human life’s at stake, will survive all onslaughts and live, and gain acceptance as time moves on. This I know full well. The old way is wounded, and sooner or later will die.

The new way I’ve explored and mapped will grow in recognition. The new plan incorporates that one truly essential ingredient, THE TRUTH. TRUTH, once set free, will never die.